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The Multinational Corporation 
and Industrial Relations 
The American Approach 
Comparée! with the European 
Paul A. Heise 
The spécial problems that the MNC présents in the 
context of the American industrial relations system has 
led the U.S. unions, to respond with a call for controls on 
trade. Europeans, in a différent context, are responding to 
the intégration of Europe and the imposition of some aspects 
of the U.S. system by U.S. corporations in Europe. The 
problems of understanding each other's goals will be 
difficult, but controls on the MNCs could serve both. 
In an article in this Journal in January 1971, Paul Malles discussed 
The European Approach to the Multinational Corporation ]. He pointed 
out that amid ail the fast-growing literature on the multinational corpo-
ration, little attention has been paid to the industrial relations aspects. 
This judgment was confirmed when the Industrial Relations Research 
Association put out its thorough Review of Industrial Relations Research, 
Volume I I 2 . This research survey could only cite Paul Malles' article, 
then in mimeographed form, and 
some Trade Union .Tournais. This 
lack of académie and public interest 
HEISE, Paul A., Office of Foreign 
Policy, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Washington, D.C. 
* This study does not in any way represent the officiai opinion or policy of 
the U.S. Department of Labor. 
1
 Paul MALLES, « The Multinational Corporation and Industrial Relations : 
The European Approach, » Relations Industrielles-lndustrial Relations, Québec, 
Vol. 26, No. 1, Jan. 1971, pp. 64-83. 
2
 Benjamin AARON et al., eds., A Review of Industrial Relations Research, 
Vol. II, IRRA Séries, Madison, Wisc, 1971. 
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is puzzling in light of the wide spread and vociferous complaints of the 
labor movements in Europe and the United States against the multinational 
corporation. The subject deserves more work and the title of the Malles 
articles invites a response in regard to the American approach. This article 
hopes to do that. However, when discussing the American approach, it 
will be necessary and appropriate to compare it to the European approach 
and outline the différences that hâve caused a divergence of approach. 
More information and analysis hâve become available since Malles wrote 
and this will be utilized. 
The analysis of the MNC is indeed enmeshed in the « facts, fears, 
and fancy » as well as politics, culture, and ideology of those who are 
discussing it. The dichotomy of views that on the one hand sees that — 
the multinational corporation is beyond a doubt the most powerful 
agency for régional and global économie unity that our century has 
produced. It is fundamentally an instrument of peace. Its transactions 
are trans-national in nature and purpose. Its interest is to emphasize 
the common goals of people, to reconcile or remove différences 
between them. It cannot thrive in a régime of international tension 
and conflict3. 
contrasts sharply with — 
(The multinational corporations) now pose serious problems of 
political control and social responsibility to the sovereign nations 
of the world. If unrestrained, they hâve the potential to make a 
travesty of ail the décades of social and économie advancement 
enjoyed by American working people 4. 
Thèse two views are of course not mutually exclusive ; they are 
much the same thing depending upon the point of view. When one 
puts aside the question of Pareto optimality and efficiency, and addresses 
the question of whether or not the multinational corporation constitutes 
a challenge to the industrial relations Systems as they hâve developed 
in both Europe and the United States, one can only answer in the 
affirmative, and search out the response which that challenge has found 
in the trade union movement. The next question is about the efficacy of 
that response and its potential success in maintaining, changing, or 
adjusting the industrial relations System of which it is a part in face of 
3
 Neil H. JACOBY, « The Multinational Corporation, » The Center Magazine, 
Santa Barbara, Calif. Center for Study of Démocratie Institutions, Vol. III, No 3, 
May 1970, p. 54. 
4 View point, an IUD Quarterly, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C. : Vol. 1, No. 2, 
Summer 1971, p. 10. 
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the challenge. The multinational corporation can présent differing chal-
lenges to the United States and European industrial relations System at 
the same time because the goals, strategy, and environment of the two 
situations, while not conflicting, often differ in important ways. Canada 
will undoubtedly provide a unique response, although for purposes of 
foreign investment it tends to conform more to the European expérience 
than to that of the United States. 
The previous article pointed out quite correctly the great confusion 
that has existed in regard to what is the appropriate définition of the 
multinational corporation or enterprise. The Malles article emphasized 
the définition by professors Vernon and Behrman. The Behrman définition 
chooses the qualification of the « multinational corporation as a domestic 
corporation. » The point of attention is the locus of decision-making5. 
The définition by Raymond Vernon also emphasizes « common owner-
ship and responsive to a common management strategy » 6. But lie states 
later in his book : 
Remember what the overseas commitments of U.S. controlled mul-
tinational enterprises consist of. Measured by equity ownership, they 
are 90% or more American ; by source of funds, perhaps 25% 
American; by the identity of employées, less than 1% American; 
and by the identity of the governments that receive their taxes, 
practically 100% foreign. 7 
The Americans recognize the central aspect of decision-making but 
then go on to analyze the MNC as a problem in finance, balance of pay-
ments and clash of élites. 
5
 MALLES, op. cit., p. 65. 
6 Vernon's article, « Economie Sovereignty at Bay, » Foreign Affairs, October 
1968, to which Malles referred, has been enlarged into a book, Sovereignty at Bay : 
The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises, Basic Books, New York, London, 
1971. In this work he redefines multinational corporation as « appearing to hâve 
access to a common pool of human and financial resources, and (which) seem res-
ponsive to éléments of a common strategy, » p. 4. The immense and long-range 
project on which Professor Vernon and the Harvard group hâve been focusing on 
has as its définition the « 180 enterprises on the Fortune 500 list (which had manu-
facturing subsidiaries in 6 or more countries, and (which) alone accounted for 
more than 2,000 of the 2,500 of the subsidiary countries of the entire Fortune 
group; thèse were labelled «multinational enterprises.» He finds 187 multinational 
enterprises which had 6 or more foreign subsidiaries in 1967. This is not far from 
the generally accepted number of 200. The Vernon group at Harvard has now 
moved on to the study of Eurepean companies which they estimate to total 
about 120, or 40% of the total. 
7
 VERNON, Sovereignty at Bay, p. 264. 
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European analysis of the MNC normally focuses on the décision 
centers, as Malles emphasizes the domestic (read American) corporation 
in Behrman's description. Thus the European trade unionists at an OECD 
meeting8 generally agreed : 
The most important feature common to multinational companies 
from a trade union point of view was that thèse companies had 
power centers outside the country in which the establishments con-
cerned were operating. 
Using this focus of power centers and their relation to the nation 
state, the MNCs are described as being ethnocentric (bound to the 
customs and conventions of the home country), polycentric (identifica-
tion to a degree with the host country), and a third stage, geocentric 
(world oriented and presumably not biased toward its host or parent 
country). Thèse stages represent a progressive release of the décision 
center from a national culture and from national control. It is generally 
agreed that few if any companies hâve reached the third stage. It is 
probaMy significant that though this division is repeated in a number 
of articles 9 it is never mentioned in Vernon's well-documented book.10 
The failure of American analysis to answer the question of the position 
of the power or decision-making center is a reflection of the view from 
which they are taking their perspective — usually U.S. companies are 
exercising control in other countries. 
The contrast between the European and American views on the 
multinational corporation will hâve to deal with distinctions in the environ-
ment of industrial relations, the unions themselves, and in the point of 
view towards the MNC. The industrial relations Systems of a country is 
an elaborate web of rules that differs significantly among countries. It 
is made more complex by technology, specialization and the large scale 
of opérations11 such as exist in the MNC. 
8
 OECD Report on the Meeting of Trade Union Experts on Multinational 
Companies, Manpower and Social Affairs Directorate, Paris, July 23, 1970, MAS 
(69) (23). 
9
 Robert L. HEILBRONER, « The Multinational Corporation », New York Review 
of Books, February 11, 1971 ; Neil H. JACOBY, op. cit. 
io ibid. 
11
 Clark KERR et al., eds., Industrialisai and Industrial Man, New York, Ox-
ford University Press, 1964, p. 24. 
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Those aspects of the industrial relations web of rules in other 
industrial countries (mainly Europe) which differ significantly and are 
likely to affect their response to the MNC and make it différent include : 
1. the generaly very strong political orientation of most European 
unions ; 
2. the opposition, real or doctrinaire, of most important European 
unions to the capitalist System ; 
3. the much greater coverage by European law of many aspects 
of industrial relations, especially fringe benefits ; 
4. the more extensive limitation by European public authorities 
of many management prérogatives ; 
5. the scope of collective bargaining in Europe — wider in geo-
graphy but narrower in substance.12 
The objectives of the industrial relations policies and practices in 
the United States are fundamentally économie. Those aspects of the 
protten which in Europe may be considered sociological, psychological, 
human relations, political, and so forth, are in the United States judged 
on the basis of their économies. American unions hâve accepted this 
capitalistic mode of thinking and hâve adopted what is called business 
unionism. This is in fact the only country in which a strong System of 
organized labor has accepted the capitalist form of organization. The 
unions hâve concentrated heavily on bringing pressure upon a particular 
employer to obtain the économie and job-related concessions that might 
elsewhere been obtained through the political System. The industrial 
relations values and techniques in the United States hâve been oriented 
rather sharply to the efficient development, allocation, and utilization of 
human resources associated with a particular enterprise.13 The range of 
management prérogatives in industrial relations is not so wide abroad as 
it is in the United States. 
The American labor movement chose to use the government to 
seek only those ends which it felt it could not gain by means of individual 
company or industry collective bargaining. U.S. unions hâve shared with 
the Europeans a distrust of the open price System and the belief that 
wages should be taken out of compétition. This is not because they did 
not accept the opération of the price mechanism but that they felt that 
12 John C. SHEARER, «Industrial Relations of American Corporations A-
broad», in Solomon Barkin, et al., eds., International Labor, Industrial Relations 
Research Association Séries, Harper & Row, New York, 1967, p. 114. 
13 Md., p. 110. 
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it could be and was distorted, by governments, cartels, private power 
and other factors that nurtured private greed at public expense. 
The MNC, which faces the American industrial relations complex, 
does not présent the same face to the European complex. In Europe the 
MNC is an immigrant, not an emigrant ; it is invading, not leaving an 
environment. It is the création of a branch mentality in Europe and a 
headquarters in the United States. European expérience with the MNC 
is the inverse of the U.S. expérience. There is no reason to expect the 
U.S. union to view the MNC in the same way and to react in the same 
manner as the European union. The unions in Europe look at the MNC 
as a political problem. The U.S. union has been negotiating with the 
MNC as an économie bargaining partner. 
The flow and type of funds is significant. It is interesting to note 
that in 1968 (latest available figures) the total European assets in the 
U.S., (26.0 billion) exceeded those of the U.S. in Europe ($24.7 billion), 
but only $7.8 billion of the European assets were in direct investment 
(Le., those giving a controlling interest) against $19.4 billion of U.S. 
assets in Europe.14 
The Europeans view the MNC as an invasion that, by a décision 
over which it has no control, is likely to hâve disturbing implications 
for traditional patterns of labor relations and for trade union rights. It 
clearly appears as an attack that will hâve repercussions on their national 
sovereignty. Ail of thèse challenges are political. They are matters 
handled by the normal means that the European labor movement uses in 
a political context where it has trust and faith in its government to protect 
labor's interest as well as the government's own interests against the 
outside threat. For the American labor leader, the MNC is seen as a 
runaway shop that raises the spectre of closed plants, unemployment, 
loss of fringe benefits, as well as the weapon of ultimate victory for 
management in the collective bargaining arena. To the American labor 
leader thèse are économie probflems that can only be solved by keeping 
the MNC at home in the United States employing Americans and bar-
gaining with Americans. The U.S. government does not perceive any 
14 James LEONTIADES, « The European Challenge : A Response, Atlantic Com-
munity Quarterly, New York City, Winter 1970, pp. 492-502. This study points 
out that «some foreign firms are beginning to look at the (United States) with 
the biggest market in the world, less as a threat and more as the new land of 
corporate opportunity ». 
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threat — so long as it has control over the décision center, taxes, and 
the home base of the business. 
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AS SOMETHING NEW 
The MNC has been around for a long time.15 But in addition to 
the three facts that Malles sees as new — (1) sheer growth, (2) a 
change in the nature of management, and (3) the question of the 
économie sovereignty of the welfare state — there is a fourth factor 
that should be considered: (4) the internationalization of the division 
of labor. 
(1) The sheer growth of the multinational or international corpor-
ation during the 1960's has been documented in any number of sources,16 
whether it is measured in direct foreign investment, increase in the volume 
of sales, or increase in assets controlled by foreign firms. There is little 
doubt that the problem is of major proportions to any analyst viewing 
the world business, économie, or political scène. 
(2) The change in the nature of management and the problems 
attendant on the shift of the locus of control is also wetl documented 
by Servan-Schreiber and others. The réduction in the independence and 
flexibility of the subsidiary in an âge of instant communication and 
Mach 2 airlines, is analogous to the downgrading of diplomatie missions. 
This aspect has received less attention in the United States. There is no 
évidence that U.S. analysts and government officiais hâve corne to realize 
the powerful reaction this problem causes in the host country. Rather, 
they seem to be responding principally to activities of the U.S. labor 
movement. 
(3) The confflict between the MNC and the économie goals of the 
nation-state are now the center of discussion. 17 The problem is usually 
15
 The Hudson's Bay Company (1670) still survives; but earlier than that 
were the merchant princes and banking empires. In modem times the spread of 
extractive industries has been prominent. 
16
 The most famous is, of course : Jean-Jacques SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le Défi 
Américain (Paris : Édition de Noël, 1967). For a more académie and contrasting 
présentation see Stephen HYMER and Robert ROWTHORN, Multinational Corporations 
and International Oligopoly : The Non-American Challenge, Yale Univ., New 
Haven, Conn., Economie Growth Center Paper No. 149, 1970. The basic statistical 
work is : G.C. HUFBAUER and F.M. ADLER, Overseas Manufacturing Investment 
and the Balance of Payments (Washington, D.C., U.S. Treasury Dept., (1968). 
17
 See Stephen HYMER, Direct Foreign Investment and the National Economie 
Interest, Yale University Economie Growth Center, Center Paper No. 108, 1967, 
where it is applied to Canada. 
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS : . . . 41 
stated in terms of the « welfare state » because Gunnar Myrdal first 
noted the problem in his book, Beyond the Welfare State.18 The em-
phasis is now shifting to considération of the political concept of a threat 
to national sovereignty rather than the économie threat to a nation's 
welfare state. Vernon never mentions Myrdal in his book, Sovereignty 
at Bay, though Myrdal's statement of the problem 19 remains the classic. 
The use of the term sovereignty has advantages because the problem has 
aspects beyond the économie. But « welfare state » is stilll the better term 
because it puts the emphasis on the économie without neglecting the 
political, and focuses attention more appropriately so far as the labor 
movement is concerned. 
The American labor movement views the problem as économie, 
but it is essential to understand the political context in which they are 
forced to protect their interest. Vernon, in his switch to the political 
problem of élites and cultural collision, barely recognizes the existence 
of the économie conflicts which may arise in regard to the MNC and 
industrial relations, unions or collective bargaining. 20 American acadé-
mies and government policymakers seem at best uninterested in the 
problem. For instance, in a récent issue of Foreign Affairs21 the inter-
national corporations were seen as an appropriate emerging countervailing 
force to the power of the unions. The article picks up a comment in an 
earlier article22 to the effect that the U.S. is becoming more service 
than production oriented and suggests this as a means to split the U.S. 
labor movement and keep the service trades supporting the free trade po-
!8 Gunnar MYRDAL, Beyond the Welfare State, Bantam Books, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London, 1960, p. 62. A welfare state is one with « 
fairly explicit commitments to the broad goals of économie development, full em-
ployment, equality of opportunity for the young, social security, and protected 
minimum standards as regards not only income, but nutrition, housing, health, 
and éducation for people of ail régions and social groupsx 
19
 Gunnar MYRDAL, Economie Theory and Underdeveloped Régions. Harper 
Torchbooks, New York, 1971. Originally published in 1957 under the title, Rich 
Lands and Poor. 
20
 VERNON, op. cit., pp. 188-191, treats labor as a homogeneous commodity, 
collective bargaining as a test of nerve, and labor groups as directly at odds with 
one another. 
21
 C. Fred BERGSTEN, « Crisis in U.S. Trade Policy », Foreign Affairs, New 
York, July 1971, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 619-635. Bergsten served in the Economies 
Bureau of the State Department, as a Trade Advisor on the National Security 
Council Staff, and is now with the Brookings Institution. 
22 Lawrence B. KRAUSE, « Trade Policy for the Seventies », Columbia Journal 
of World Business, New York, Jan.-Feb. 1971, p. 10. 
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sition. Neither of thèse sources suggests any remedy for the problems of the 
labor movement, which is expected to take care of itself. The principal 
reason that the unions hâve this problem is that U.S. unions hâve 
bargained with individual employers to obtain their « welfare state. » 
Pension rights, seniority, hospitalization, leave time and other régulations 
that are in Europe covered by législation and considered a right:, hâve 
been obtained in the United States by the labor movement through 
collective bargaining. Thèse « fringe benefits » are not considered a 
political right in the United States. Layoff régulations are an example 
of this. In the United States layoff s are simple, routine, and almost cost-
less for the employer, while in Europe they are costly, complex, restricted, 
and often impossible, particularly where there is substantial unemploy-
ment. 23 
(4) The internationalization of the division of labor, the fourth 
aspect of change associated with the MNC, is perceived by labor in the 
United States as the most important problem. This process has been 
little studied and little understood. The allocation of production strictly 
according to the least-cost imperatives of neo-classical international 
économies would, in a world of mobile technology and country-free 
management, allocate manufacturing according to labor costs. Then 
branch plants would be put in Europe, sub-assembly opérations in the 
Third World, and headquarters in North America. Such a division of 
jobs and benefits will maximize the woiûd flow of goods and services, 
but would détermine the number and types of jobs that went where, and 
how the benefits of this efficiency were to be distributed. This just may 
not be in conformance with the desires of the unions in the various 
countries nor with the distribution appropriate to the various économies. 
Market imperfections that send one oligopolist chasing another into 
otherwise closed markets or in search of low cost assembly labor could 
hâve sudden and overwhelming impact on job markets. This would visit 
the host market with the distortions of isolated and over-paid demand 
and the home market with the disruptions of an industry moving out. M 
There is every possibility of a négative sum game for labor. 
23
 JACOBY, op. cit. Jacoby notes that the G.M. and Remington Rand layoffs 
in France that brought angry press comment were « amply justified . . . as a quest 
for efficiency T>. He suggests France should be more open to thèse « painful dis-
turbances to its status quo». 
24
 See Stephen HYMER, «The Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational 
Corporations », American Economie Review, Menasha, Wisc, Vol. LX, No. 2, 
May 1970, pp. 441-448 for the broadest review of the problems of the MNC. 
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Europe and Canada are getting the branch plant establishment as 
Ford buMs transmissions outside the United States for Pintos to be sold 
in the United States, or Timex builds its machined parts in the United 
Kingdom or Scotland for assembly and sale in the United States. The U.S. 
labor movement sees this development of the international division of 
labor as a distinct threat. 
The European governments are apparently aware of the implications 
of this problem. Their response to Le Défi Américain and this head-
quarters/branch plant situation that would make them « hewers of wood 
and drawers of water » for the multinational U.S. firms, has been to 
adopt an infant industry argument with regard to the restructuring and 
rebuilding of those industries that they consider essential to their national 
interests, i.e., nuclear, electrical/electronic, chemical, and aero-space. 
Efforts in behalf of the domestic firms entail ail the normal government 
activities involved in heavy government support — planning the suspen-
sion of the usual standards of profitability and independent compétition, 25 
etc. The ambivalence that the Secrétariat of International Confédération 
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was demonstrating at the time Malles 
was writing has diminished. They are no longer bending over backwards 
in their récognition of the positive aspects of the MNC. 26 
The ICFTU and the European labor movement can realistically 
call for the MNC to avoid social hardships and to be subjected to public 
authority in its opération. The option for this attitude is not really open 
to the labor movement in the United States. 
Union permit workers to utilize their bargaining power in nego-
tiations or to achieve through législation improvements in économie 
social conditions which might not hâve been available through 
market forces. Unfair labor compétition within a national economy 
can be minimized through législation or through union agreements 
covering an industry. But no such process is available on an inter-
national level, 27 
U.S. and European unions use both bargaining and législation to attain 
their goals, but the différence is in emphasis. The U.S. unions are more 
25 LEONTIADES, op. cit., pp. 500-501. 
26 IGGTU Agenda Item 2 : Multinational Companies, ICFTU World Economie 
Conférence (WEC) Geneva, 24-26 June 1971. 
27 Solomon BARKIN, « Labor's Position on Tarif f Réduction», Industrial Re-
lations, Berkeley, Calif., Vol. I, May 1962, p. 50. 
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prone to use collective bargaining and the Europeans more prone to use 
législation to protect their économie and social conditions and minimize 
the unfair labor compétition presented by the MNC. The U.S. unions 
cannot use collective bargaining because its one-on-one methodology 
permits the MNC to escape. The Europeans hâve less fear of the MNC 
because they feel législation is available, that they can expect a sym-
pathetic hearing from the government which they expect to control the 
entire environment. Their traditional avenue of relief is more efficient 
in this instance. 
STRATEGY OF THE UNIONS 
Stratégies of the European unions that Malles outlines are often a 
response to the historical development of the European Economie Com-
munity as much as the MNC. The stratégies of the American labor move-
ment share activities pertaining to this wider scope. Hère I am speaking 
of the AFL-CIO unions, as Malles spoke of the ICFTU and the Inter-
national Trade Secrétariats (ITS). The United Auto Workers (UAW), 
the only substantial national and trade oriented group outside of the 
AFL-CIO, is very active on the international scène, initiating, and even 
pre-dating some of the most prominent activities of the ITS. The UAW 
has, for a number of reasons, maintained a low profile or réticence in 
regard to récent opérations of the MNC : the récent death of Walter 
Reuther, who was a motivating force ; the problems that hâve arisen in 
regard to the UAW approved Canadian Auto Pact ; movement of the 
U.S. auto industry to production in Japan and Europe for the U.S. 
market ; and a préoccupation with very serious domestic problems. The 
top eschelon of the UAW is cognizant of and studying changes in the 
MNC and reviewing their position. They hâve not yet felt it necessary 
or appropriate to make or change their public position. Nor hâve they 
stated that they disagree in any way with the stand of the AFL-CIO. 
Malles claimed : 
The impetus in the whole matter of multinational corporations in 
Europe cornes from the trade union centres and their affiliâtes in 
the countries of the Common Market. 2§ 
The same can be said to a certain extent for the United States, but for 
a différent reason. A great deal of study of the multinational corporation 
was being performed but had not corne to public attention until the AFL-
2 8
 MALLES, op. cit., p. 70. 
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CIO and its affiliâtes began to complain. Although the Harvard project 
was funded and operating in 1965, not until 1969 and the complaints 
of the AFL-CIO did the problem become a public issue. 
Stratégies outlined by Malles on the part of the Europeans include 
adaptations in : 1) organizational structure, 2) techniques of collective 
bargaining, and 3) attempts at changes in national and international 
law to fill « the vacuum of législation and régulation » concerning the 
MNC. Many of the changes that are presently being sought by the labor 
movement in Europe arise from European intégration and are analogous 
to changes that took place earlier in the United States' labor management 
environment. As the United States became a national market, the 
workers' représentatives changed their organizational structures into a 
national fédération as is now taking place in Europe. Similarly techniques 
of collective bargaining changed with the establishment of the industrial 
unions and nation-wide industrial bargaining. The passage of the Wagner 
Act legitimizing the scope and opérations of thèse changes and of the 
labor movement itself was part of ail this. 
The Europeans are of course starting from a différent base and 
using a différent strategy, but the goals they are seeking are not that 
différent. The expansion of the market and the rationalization of the 
firms as they spread within that market call for analogous responses on 
the part of représentatives of workers. Europeans might in fact find 
lessons, good and bad, by a study of the prior movements in the United 
States. The devdlopments in Europe hâve not been a response to just 
MNC, but a response to the whole nexus of changes presently occuring 
in the politics and économies of that area. Where the changes in organiza-
tional structure hâve not been related principally to European intégration 
States. The developments in Europe hâve not been a response to just the 
taken part but hâve been initiators of activity. The International Metal-
workers Federation's leadership in this area has been in large part a 
response to the genius and vision of Walter Reuther. It is not necessary 
to go through the full response of thèse unions because, perhaps unfor-
tunately, participation in the International1 Trade Secrétariats has been 
on an individual union basis on the part of the Americans. Thèse activities 
hâve been independent of and sometimes contradictory to the unions' 
position in the United States. 
International joint bargaining has also seen participation of Ame-
rican unions, though they hâve not had the same leading rôle in this area. 
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The American glass workers were prominently involved in the St. Gobain 
bargaining, but that case as the Fabian Research Séries29 and Malles 
point out, is probably more publicized than it deserves. That case was 
so unique that its only relevance may be that the publicity generated by 
it wilil raise hopes and tensions which will themselves create opportunities 
that might not otherwise hâve existed. However, the factors that made 
success possible — the publicity and the attempted stock market take-
over of St. Gobain — cannot take away from the fact that unions did 
coordinate bargaining on an international basis. 
The prévention of crises and the « quiet diplomacy » by means of 
interventions through national associations, the government, or employers' 
associations at the point of final decision-making is not as much a part 
of the American expérience. The U.S. method calls for threats of strikes, 
strikes and crisis bargaining at the termination of contracts and has both 
parties shouting from the housetops to bring public support. Sometimes 
the well-publicized termination date and the mounting tension as that 
date approaches does in fact mask a great deal of quiet diplomacy. 
The U.S. labor movement has chosen a fourth strategy : government 
control over trade, exports of capital, exports of technology, and ail other 
facets of the opération of the MNC in what appears to be a completely 
isolationist protectionist shift in policy. 
The AFL-CIO, and especially the Industrial Unions Department, 
is strongly supporting the Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972 
(S. 2592 and H.R. 10914). This proposai is described as the 
. . . first complète législative program to bring together in one bill 
a reshaping of tax, trade, and other fédéral laws to challenge the 
international crisis that threatens American workers' jobs and the 
U.S. économie future. 
. . . the bill offers remédies to spécifie trade and investment pro-
blems that the AFL-CIO has voiced to Congress for the past several 
years. 30 
The bill provides for the tightening of tax and patent régulations of 
MNCs. It would establish quota levels for ail imports based the 1965-69 
period, unless specifically exempted. It would regulate the outflow of 
29
 Fabian Research Séries, 279, Politics and the Multinational Corporation, 
London, Dec. 1969. 
30 AFL-CIO Fact Sheet, Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972 (H. R. 
10914 and S. 2592), Washington, D.C. 
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capital, technology, and equipment based on the impact on employment. 
The bill would change the administration of the U.S. trade program and 
tighten marking requirements, anti-dumping régulations, and adminis-
trative procédures. 
The labor movement views the MNC as an économie threat to jobs 
and fringe benefits. Perhaps, more importantly, the MNC is considered 
a political threat to collective bargaining strength and ultimately the 
U.S. System of industrial relations. The labor movement considers thèse 
threats serious enough to motivate this change in a policy that is a 
century old. At this point it is essential to make clear that the unions 
hâve no proof that their fears are well-grounded — that is, they do not 
blâme présent levels of demand or unemployment on the MNC. What 
they do see is an increasing rate of potentially harmful situations where 
continuation would be disasterous. 
The American labor movement is faced with a situation where it 
believes that its traditional method — collective bargaining with a parti-
cular firm or industry — is no longer appropriate ; they cannot do battle 
when their opponent can step out of the ring and go elsewhere. Their 
attempt to take wages out of compétition has never been favorably 
viewed by either government or business in the United States. They hâve 
no reason to suspect that the companies with which they bargain are 
going to accord to the workers in the LDC's the very costly benefits and 
working conditions for which the American unions hâve bargained so 
hard. The unions being well aware of the fact that thèse are costly 
benefits, are aware that because of the absence of thèse costs the em-
ployer can produce at a lower unit cost in Korea or Mexico. In the 
absence of fair labor standards, they see the MNCs able to exploit 
workers in both areas and see the only défense as domestic controls. If 
they cannot control production they must try to control the market. 
The U.S. labor movement faces the situation where the major 
décisions affecting employment, living conditions, and allocation of 
resources are set by other groups determining économie and social policy, 
with the employment and manpower effects a dépendent variable. This 
also leads the labor movement to see controls on trade as its only alter-
native. But it is not just jobs, working conditions and aggregate demand. 
Fringe benefits are far more comprehensive and far more likely to be 
embodied in law in other countries, especially Europe than in the United 
States. Thus while the American worker is faced with the loss of ail of 
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thèse benefits should his employer move, the European, receiving his 
benefits from the government, would continue to receive them should 
the company move. 
If we go back to the earlier cited différences between the industrial 
relations parameters in Western Europe and the United States, we see 
that the European government has a stake in keeping its business within 
its territory, and that by use of what is called in the United States « the 
limitation of management prérogatives » can keep a corporation from 
moving and insist on R & D expenditures or the establishment of com-
plète production faciiities.31 The U.S. unions are saying in effect that 
pending the type of control on corporations that is presently available 
in Europe, they must seek to control trade or the ability of the MNC to 
transfer production and productivity outside the United States. 
In international trade, the domestic firm could be injured and 
unaMe to provide the necessary benefits. In this case of trade related 
dislocation the unions agreed to accept the burden of adjustment if they 
could hâve available the means to cushion the adjustment. The U.S. 
government agreed and granted the trade adjustment assistance provisions 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.32 Between 1962 when the act 
was passed, and 1969, not a single case of adjustment assistance was 
provided. Only in 1969 and then under very tenuous circumstances that 
may not continue, certain benefits were given out to workers principally 
in industries with political strength : steel and shoes. 
The U.S. labor movement has always conditioned its support of 
tariff réductions and tariff expansion on the non-injury of domestic 
workers or adjustment assistance when displacements occurred. 33 Solo-
mon Barkin, former Director of Research of the Textile Workers Union 
of America, was voicing a basic labor movement distinction when he 
insisted in any liberalized trade policy that people and not production must 
31
 The refusai of U.S. companies to submit to this kind of control of their 
« management prérogatives » has caused serious problems in Europe and is one 
of the reasons the political problem is coming to the fore. 
32
 Title III, Tariff Adjustment and Other Adjustment Assistance, Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962, Washington, D.C. Unfortunately, this resort to the govern-
ment for benefits and protection within the dynamic economy proved futile. 
33
 Hearings, Committee on Ways and Means, House or Représentatives, Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, H.R. 9900, Committee Print, 87th Congress. 2nd Session, 
Washington, D.C, March 19, 1962, Testimony of George Meany, pp. 11-46, ff. 
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be protected.34 European unions never had this problem either with 
trade or the MNC since the provisions of their welfare state protected 
then from thèse vicissitudes of the market place. 
COMPARATIVE STRATEGIES 
The European and U.S. labor movements agrée on points 1, 2 and 
3, that is, the U.S. unions agrée to organizational structures at a world 
level of fédération because they hâve had expérience within their own 
milieu of independent power centers that contribute to the goals of 
everyone in a fédération. They support international collective bargaining 
because this also is a tradition which they recognize and from which they 
see benefits. The idea of using the non-legal institutions such as gênerai 
conférences and meetings outside the public eye is used extensively in 
non-bargaining situations by the American labor movement. They also 
are accustomed to working in the tripartite ILO. 
The jourth response : the trade restrictions advocated by the U.S. 
labor movement — the essential différence between the U.S. and Euro-
pean approach — appear to arise from three sources : 
1. Différences in the locus of the labor movement in relation to 
the decision-making process of the MNC. The decision-making center 
remains in the U.S. and causes no problems for the domestic labor move-
ment. For the European, who does not hâve control over the decision-
making, and sometimes cannot even détermine where that decision-
making is, this aspect becomes a very serious and in fact paramount 
problem. But the only way the American unionist can influence that 
decision-making is through controls on trade. He cannot influence 
décisions as he is accustomed to by means of légal, collective bargaining, 
or informai activity. 
2. Différences in goals and stratégies. The divergent cultural envi-
ronment means that the European seeks control by means of political 
activity whereas the American seeks what are in the end essentially the 
same benefits and security through économie bargaining with his cor-
porate counterpart. When the MNC is gone from the United States there 
is no production control by which the union can apply pressure. The 
union must then control the économie bargaining power through limits 
on the MNC's opérations elsewhere. 
34 Solomon BARON, op. cit., pp. 49-63. 
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3. Différences in government approach. In the United States the 
unions hâve not obtained benefits through the government and there is 
far less trust by ail three members, government, labor and business, 
than there is in Europe. This différence in approach of industry to 
government has become more noticed since the concept of « Japan, Inc. » 
has corne to the public consciousness. The emerging realization of the 
différence in the nation-state approach will play an increasing rôle in 
policy making. 
COMMENTS AND PROSPECTS 
Malles seemed to agrée with the relegation of the MNC to a fear 
and tension rather than économie problem. His quote that illustrations 
of interventions by the MNC were « patently exceptions or far-fetched » 
seemed to give assent that it would be « difficult or improbable » for 
the multinational enterprise « to dry up technology or export technicians 
or drain off capital or shift profits or alter priées or allocate markets » 
or be an instrument of U.S. policy. The balance now seems to be 
shifting, with a doubt as to the économie impact, but no longer a claim 
it is farfetched. 
The multinational enterprise as an économie institution seems capable 
of adding to the world aggregate productivity and économie growth, 
as compared with the visible alternatives... Conclusions regarding 
the distribution of the benefits of that growth are more uncertain . . . 
as for the distribution of benefits within the country, it is difficult 
to say how the opérations of multinational enterprises are affecttng 
the outeome. 35 
The problem of the MNC is something more than just the existence 
of tensions which must be controlled. While some economists remain 
convinced that you cannot specifically document the « badness » of the 
MNC, they are no longer content to say that the problem is just tensions. 
The attempts of U.S. corporations to carry over into other cultural 
and national environments the attitudes and prérogatives of the American 
domestic situation are what has caused most of the problem and fear of 
the MNC on the part of Europeans and others. Professor Kindleberger 
has noted the history of insensitive treatment of Latin America : 
A long history of cavalier treatment of Latin American individuals, 
traditions, governments, and business by American businessmen 
3 5
 VERNON, op. cit., p. 248. 
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corrupts attempts to keep the discussion on an économie level, and 
even then such législation as the Hickenlooper amendment leads 
Latin Americans to believe that the United States turns économie 
disputes into political shows of strength. 36 
The illustrations of more proximate problems are being catalogued. 
U.S. firms that hâve been reported to hâve refused to recognize collective 
bargaining agents include : Kodak, Gillette, Caterpillar, Firestone, and 
TWA, ail in Britain ; United Fruit Company in various Latin American 
countries. Other U.S. companies including IBM in Sweden and parti-
cularly American-owned automobile companies in Britain hâve refused to 
conform to established collective bargaining procédures. They hâve 
threatened to switch production, such as Ford in Britain and Belgium ; 
and General Motors and Remington hâve carried out mass dismissals 
in France. 
Malles comments on several of the stratégies that he believes will 
hâve an impact on control of the MNC : collective bargaining, législation 
on the « European company, » labor standards, and changes in the 
« rules of the game » in regard to the MNC. 
The collective bargaining goals laid out by the AutoWorkers 
Conférence contains ail the essentials of a carefully thought out and 
obtainable international program. Thèse are worth repeating hère : 
40-hour work week ; guaranteed annual wage ; security of empîoy-
ment ; equal rights for women workers ; harmonization of rest and 
relief time ; trade union controls of speeds ; improved holidays and 
holiday pay ; adéquate retirement pensions ; trade union rights in the 
shop ; improved vocational training; paid educational and cultural 
leave ; protection of older workers. 37 
(Italics are Malles'). This list does not contain a call for wage parity.38 
It is difficult to document, but seems fairly clear that the U.S. labor 
movement is really seeking parity of unit labor costs so that compétition 
for the location of opérations by a MNC would not be determined by 
36 Charles P. KINDLEBERGER, éd. The International Corporation, a Symposium, 
Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1970. 
37 MALLES, op. cit., p. 79. 
38 Malles dismisses wage parity as impossible because hourly wage costs 
differ so widely in the breakdown between wages and fringe benefits in the EEC 
countries : he cites direct wages are 54.0% of labor costs for workers in Italy and 
71.3% in Luxembourg; social security contributions for workers in France re-
present 23.5% of total hourly labor costs, 26.3% in Italy and only 14.4% in Ger-
many. 
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either its ability to pay lower wages or provide less benefits to its 
workers. 
A European company law is not just a European problem, for any 
such law is likely to subject outside enterprises to spécial area-wide 
discrimination and restraints.39 European Incorporation and the Euro-
pean patent would not be available to U.S.-owned subsidiaries in 
Europe. 40 Europeans operating already in a multiplicity of overlapping 
jurisdictions could very well incorporate within their law labor protection 
policies that could reach out to other areas. In light of the fact that the 
American labor movement is not likely to achieve comprehensive controls 
on trade or the opérations of the MNC they might want to look to the 
evolving European law as a model upon which to build their demands 
of the U.S. Congress and business community. It could also be argued 
that thèse corporations are already subject to such régulations in Europe 
and there is little reason that they should give American workers less in 
the way of security and benefits than they give the Europeans. 
Labor standards constitute another problem. European business has 
not suffered in its growth or stability because it has become an intégral 
part of the welfare state and ail that implies in the way of planning, 
benefits and coopération with labor and the government. The U.S. cor-
porations may find it to their advantage both politically and economically 
to cooperate in the development of a commitment to an international 
welfare state. An enlightened management would view the integrative 
and market-building potentials of commitment to the establishment of 
international labor standards as a profitable and forward step. Then the 
claim by the strong advocates of the MNC that it can exist only in an 
environment of peace and coopération would hâve a basis for their claim. 
The U.S. labor movement has appealed, without any success, for 
international fair labor standards for close to 30 years. They hâve been 
alone up to this point because the appeal often has been misinterpreted 
as a call for protection for U.S. workers. The appeal of such a program 
is better understood and beginning to spread. The need has become 
évident to other bodies and institutions. The Havana Charter of the 
proposed International Trade Organization originally contained the 
concept, but it was never carried over into the GATT when the original 
charter failed of passage. U.S. observers still seem unaware of the purpose 
39 VERNON, op. cit., p. 245. 
40 ibid., p. 246. 
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of such standards. In a startling misunderstanding of labor's position, 
Vernon sees an international forum in charge of ground rules as a tool 
against U.S. labor interests although he agrées in the second last sentence 
in his book that such a body would be « charged with weighing the 
activities of the multinational enterprise against a set of social yardsticks 
that are multinational in scope. » 41 Some lack of success of the American 
labor movement in pushing for fair labor standards can probably be 
blamed on their lack of expérience in using the législative tool in obtain-
ing their économie ends, and a reluctance to go this road. 
An innovative program which attaches social conditions to an 
investment guarantee scheme is being attempted in Sweden. The Swedish 
Export Crédits Guarantee Board, made up of représentatives from wage 
earners' organizations and companies, insists that the investment must 
add to the économie development of the host country. Social conditions 
attached are : 1) behavioral conditions concerning gênerai norms for the 
company in the host country, and 2) benefit conditions concerning 
spécifie actions required by the company in favor of its employées. The 
Swedish initiative holds a great deal of promise and will probably be 
watched closely in Europe and the United States as well as in the Third 
World. 
SUMMATION 
The analysis of the European approach was seen as projecting the 
national goal-directed welfare state into wider multinational commu-
nities. It ended on a very hopeful note. 
The counter currents that are presently évident do not make one 
as hopeful in regard to the American expérience. The récent activity of 
the U.S. government in the area of foreign économie policy, quite aside 
from the goals and activities of the labor movement, do not lead one to 
believe that nationalism and demands for économie autarchy are dwind-
ling. The Americans do not see the integrating activity of the European 
Common Market as completely positive. A protectionist Common Agri-
cultural Policy, restrictive European company law, preferential arrange-
ments that appear to look to the création of dependencies in the 
Mediterranean basin appear as something less than hopeful. The Ameri-
can labor movement position, while not the fundamentally protectionist, 
production-oriented position that the casual observer would see, is hardly 
reassuring to the Europeans. 
4 1
 Ibid., p. 284. Emphasis added. 
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Coopération should still be possible. George Meany testified that 
the AFL-CIO seeks a national policy of healthy expansion of international 
trade on a reciprocal basis. The U.S. labor movement has been boxed 
into its restrictive position because of its inability in its tra-
ditional structure to protect its jobs and working standards. Both labor 
movements seek a constructive control of the MNC. 
A prognosis requires spéculation as to whether the U.S. govern-
ment can respond positively to the needs of the labor movement with the 
appropriate adjustment assistance program and other necessary attributes 
of the welfare state before the labor movement is able to build enough 
support among the U.S. business community to shove through the 
restrictive législation that it seeks. Even then the more basic, long-run 
problem of the MNC's attack on the institutional strength of labor will 
remain. One is forced to wonder what the labor movement will be satisfied 
with in a cumulative order : an adjustment assistance program., inter-
national fair labor standards on imports, or will it go on to demand 
control of the MNC trade and tax activities. Or will it hold out for the 
type of international institution that Vernon and the ICFTU propose ? 
The MNC may be merely an incrémental step in development of 
corporate capitalism, but its effects upon political, social, and économie 
institutions are likely to be profound and demanding of a response by 
the existing institutions. Whatever the institutional framework might be, 
when the impact has been absorbed, the European labor movement and 
the U.S. labor movement are not likely to run into conflict with each 
other since they seek the same goals and share the same concern for 
each other and the workers in the developing world. 
LA FIRME MULTINATIONALE ET LES RELATIONS 
DU TRAVAIL : L'APPROCHE AMÉRICAINE 
D'une part, on perçoit la firme multinationale comme le plus puissant agent 
de paix et de progrès du présent siècle ; d'autre part, on le voit comme une menace 
à la souveraineté politique et aux responsabilités sociales des nations libres du 
monde, tout particulièrement de leurs classes laborieuses. La société multinationale 
peut obliger les systèmes de relations du travail américain et européen à relever des 
défis distincts, parce que les objectifs, les stratégies et le milieu ambiant des deux 
systèmes, tout en ne s'opposant pas, diffèrent sous plusieurs angles importants. La 
principale orientation nouvelle de la firme multinationale au cours des dix der-
nières années réside dans le degré inédit de contrôle qu'elle donne au monde des 
affaires. Grâce à cette facilité de contrôle, la société multinationale a vraiment crû 
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dans des proportions énormes, a modifié la nature de la gestion dans le sens de la 
centralisation et de la structuration du pouvoir décisionnel et a posé un défi à la 
souveraineté économique de l'État providence. 
Un autre changement qu'il faut rattacher à la société multinationale, c'est 
la division internationale du travail se manifestant à l'échelle de la planète que 
le mouvement ouvrier américain considère comme le plus grave. Les impératifs 
de l'économie internationale néo-classique voulant que dans une technologie mou-
vante et une gestion sans frontière, la répartition de la production se fasse stricte-
ment en fonction du coût minimal allouerait la fabrication suivant les coûts de la 
main-d'œuvre. En conséquence, les usines s'implanteraient en Europe, les opérations 
élémentaires s'exécuteraient dans le tiers-monde et les sièges sociaux seraient en 
Amérique du Nord. Une pareille division des fonctions et des avantages augmen-
terait sans limite l'affluence des biens et des services, mais elle déterminerait aussi 
la structure des économies nationales selon le genre d'emplois dont elles seraient 
dotées et la façon dont les avantages résultant des rendements seraient partagés. 
Les syndicats américains voient dans la firme multinationale une menace pour 
leurs emplois et les avantages sociaux dont ils bénéficient, mais encore davantage 
pour leur pouvoir de négociation et, au bout du compte, pour le système améri-
cain des relations du travail lui-même. Parce que les syndicats américains ont ac-
cepté le syndicalisme d'affaires et qu'ils ont négocié à leur avantage avec chaque 
employeur, ils font face à une situation dans laquelle la négociation collective avec 
une société ou une industrie donnée n'est plus efficace. Par la division internationale 
du travail, la firme multinationale peut déplacer les emplois des membres des syn-
dicats vers les régions où le coût de la main-d'œuvre est bas et priver les travailleurs 
non seulement de leurs emplois mais aussi de la sécurité de leur État providence. 
Les syndicats et les gouvernements européens sont conscients d'un état de 
choses qui en feraient des usines à succursales des sociétés américaines. Les syn-
dicats européens, orientés vers la politique, se tournent vers leurs gouvernements 
dont ils attendent l'action nécessaire pour défendre l'État social. 
La stratégie des syndicats européens pour affronter la firme multinationale 
européenne a consisté à mettre au point une structure à l'échelle du monde, à ap-
puyer la négociation collective internationale et à entamer le débat au moyen 
d'institutions à caractère juridique, de conférences et de réunions. Ils s'attendent 
à l'aide de leurs gouvernements pour traiter avec les firmes multinationales des 
États-Unis. Les Américains ont participé aux activités internationales, mais sans 
reconnaître assez clairement la nécessité pour les Européens de trouver une solu-
tion au phénomène de l'intégration. Les Américains exigent qu'on exerce un con-
trôle sur les importations et la question de la firme multinationale se soulève parce 
que le contrôle du processus de production leur échappe au moment de la menace 
de grève. Les Européens n'ont pas compris que les syndicats américains ne dis-
posent d'aucun moyen politique pour contrôler les firmes. 
Le problème de la coordination des efforts des syndicats européens et amé-
ricains face à la société multinationale consiste à admettre les défis différents 
qu'ils doivent relever. Des contrôles appropriés sur les répercussions sociales dé-
coulant des firmes multinationales pourraient être utiles aux deux groupes ainsi 
qu'au bien-être général. 
